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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Intermediation  in  innovation  serves  to  establish  or improve  the link  between  different  actors  with  com-
plementary  skill  sets  or interests  in order  to support  the generation  and  diffusion  of  innovation.  This
article  conceptualises  and  analyses  intermediation  between  supply  and  demand  using  the  example  of
public  procurement  of  innovation.  It deﬁnes  speciﬁc  intermediation  needs  and  functions  in  different  pro-
curement  situations  and  outlines  the  pre-condition  for effective  intermediation.  The  paper  combines  and
contributes  to  the  growing  literature  on  innovation  intermediation  and  public  procurement  of innovation.
As the  paper  looks  at the  demand  for innovation  it adopts  a broad  understanding  of  innovation,
deﬁned  as a product,  service  or process  that is  novel  to the  buying  organisation.  In  order  to develop  the
conceptualisation  of  intermediation  in  the  process  of  demanding  innovation,  it builds  on the existing,
rather  rudimentary  conceptualisation  of intermediation  in  the innovation  and  management  literature.
It presents  an in-depth  analysis  of  two  very  different  procurement  processes  in  two  cases  in a complex
public  sector  setting,  the  English  NHS,  case  of a public  buying  organisation  triggering  the  generation  of  an
innovation,  and  another  in which  an  organisation  sought  to respond  to an  innovation  offered  in  the  mar-
ketplace.  In both  cases,  the solution  bought  necessitated  strong  adaptation  processes  with  considerable
learning  costs  within  the buying  organisation.  The  paper  shows  how  intelligent  and tailored  interme-
diation  can tackle  some  of  the  well-known  procedural  and  capability  failures  in  the  process  of  public
procurement  of  innovation.  In terms  of  policy  implications,  the  article  makes  the  claim  for  an  increased
effort  to build  up effective  intermediation  across  procurement  systems  to support  agencies  in  concrete
procurement  and, in doing  so, to build  up  capacity  for more  intelligent  public  buying.  While the  focus
on  intermediation  responds  to an  existing  gap in the  literature  on public  procurement  of  innovation,  the
paper  has  implication  for demand-supply  intermediation  more  generally.
ublis©  2015  The  Authors.  P
. Introduction
Intermediation in innovation serves to establish or enable the link
etween different actors with complementary skill sets or inter-
sts in order to support the generation and diffusion of innovation.
ur understanding of the distributed nature of innovation genera-
ion has led to a focus on the need to create linkages and support
ctors in their ability to link. Consequently, the need for linkages is
 building block in all variants of the innovation systems literature
Edquist, 1997; Freeman, 1995; Lundvall, 1988; Nelson and Winter,
982), the literature on innovation networks and clusters (Chapain
t al., 2010; Uyarra and Ramlogan, 2012), and the highly diverse
treams of literature on different modes of knowledge and innova-
ion generation (Chesbrough, 2003; Gibbons et al., 1994; Kline and
osenberg, 1986).
∗ Corresponding author.
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2015.10.010
048-7333/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article uhed  by Elsevier  B.V. This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC BY  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
The different functions and modes of intermediation in innova-
tion have become a linchpin of our understanding of interaction
in innovation systems (Howells, 2006; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008;
van Lente et al., 2003). With this paper we  want to make a concep-
tual contribution to this growing literature by focusing on speciﬁc
aspects of the link between the demand and supply of innovation.
This focus is triggered by an empirical observation and a policy
problem. In recent years we have seen a growing concern with
the conditions of demand for innovation and how demand shapes,
spurs, or hinders the direction and speed of innovation. The focus
has shifted somewhat to the problems of demanding and adopt-
ing innovative solutions. Most prominently, public procurement of
innovation (PPI) has climbed up the ladder of policy and academic
attention considerably in the last 5–10 years (Aschhoff and Sofka,
2009; Edler and Georghiou, 2007; Edquist et al., 2015; Edquist and
Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012; Rolfstam et al., 2009). As recent pol-
icy reviews have shown, public procurement of innovation is at
the heart of many innovation policy initiatives across the OECD
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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nd at EU level (Izsak and Edler, 2011; OECD, 2011; Rigby et al.,
012; Uyarra, 2016). While public procurement as a “tool for inno-
ation policy” (Geroski, 1990) has had a comeback, the adoption
f external innovation to make public services more efﬁcient and
ffective has always been part of the public sector modernisation
nd improvement agenda.
To focus on PPI as an innovation policy tool is to support and
timulate the demand for and adoption of innovation for the sake
f generating economic beneﬁt for suppliers and supply chains, on
op of the social beneﬁt generated by the public sector organisation.
onsequently, a range of additional policy measures and changes
n regulations have been introduced or are being discussed to sup-
ort PPI (Georghiou et al., 2013; Uyarra, 2016). While there is a
lethora of policy initiatives, there is still a range of shortcomings
n the actual conduct of public procurement of innovation. A num-
er of reviews (Aschhoff and Sofka, 2009; Bonaccorsi and Molinari,
011; Edquist and Hommen, 1998; Lember et al., 2007; Rolfstam,
005; Rolfstam et al., 2011; Uyarra, 2010, 2016) and a recent sur-
ey (Uyarra et al., 2014) indicate that some of the reasons for that
re a lack of organisational capabilities of all kinds (e.g. technolog-
cal, managerial), counter-productive incentive and organisational
tructures and a lack of transparency and appropriate interaction
etween demand and supply (Uyarra et al., 2014).
This paper starts with the assumption that the process by
hich public agencies ask for, buy, and adopt an innovative solu-
ion is characterised by speciﬁc, persistent challenges, and buying
rganisations need to be enabled and supported systematically to
ackle them. In line with our concern about generation and diffu-
ion of innovation, we deﬁne innovation from the perspective of
he buying organisation. Crucially, this view highlights that pub-
ic procurement of innovation “is not primarily done to enhance
he development of a new product, but to target functions that
atisfy a human need or societal problems” (Edquist and Zabala-
turriagagoitia, 2012, p. 1758). We  focus on the latter part of this
rgument, i.e. the needs of a public body providing a public service
nd responding to a societal need. Thus, in this article we  deﬁne
ublic procurement of innovation as the purchase of a solution
hat is novel to the buying organisation in order to serve an orga-
isational need. This purchase can lead to the generation of a new
olution (thus triggering an innovation) or it can relate to a solu-
ion that already exists, but has not been previously adopted by the
uying organisation (thus responding to an innovation in the mar-
etplace). As we are concerned with generation as well as adoption
f innovation and the intermediation needs that arise from asking
or and adopting something new, this deﬁnition goes beyond the
nderstanding of Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia (2012) whose
ork is limited to procurement that results in (i.e. triggers) an
nnovation.1
Public procurement of innovation in our deﬁnition poses a range
f challenges. Procurement is a complex market transaction with
 high level of functional demands and risks involved that necessi-
ates a broad range of capabilities. Markets for innovation are – by
eﬁnition – not established, needs are often novel and ill-deﬁned,
 multitude of different functions within public organisations pro-
uce different expectations and incentives to demand innovation,
he business case of new solutions offered to organisations is ill-
eﬁned at best, and the learning and adaptation costs within the
1 The more limited deﬁnition of public procurement of innovation has its justiﬁ-
ation when the focus is on innovation generation due to public procurement and
he  speciﬁc problems associated with the link of buying and generating innovation.
hile we include this problematique in this article, we go beyond this limitation
s  we  are interested in the challenges of buying something new, and the resulting
ntermediation needs. We regard our contribution as an important extension of the
urrent literature on public procurement of innovation.icy 45 (2016) 414–426 415
buying organisation are often high. Further, the generation and
adoption of innovation frequently involves iterative interactions
and necessitates joint risk management against the background of
constraining public procurement regulations. Public organisations
are – by and large – overwhelmed by those demands. They lack
crucial capabilities, are poor at linking up complementary skills
and interest both within the organisation and with external actors
in the process of deﬁning needs, exploring solutions, conducting
the procurement and adopting and using innovations. The success-
ful examples we  have seen in the literature stress the importance
of exactly those capabilities and linkages (Edler and Uyarra, 2013;
Lember et al., 2011; Rolfstam et al., 2011; Edquist et al., 2015). This
is where intermediation comes in. Procurement of innovation gen-
erates a range of intermediation needs, both between and within
organisations.
Consequently, the aim of this paper is to develop a conceptu-
alisation of intermediation between public demand and supply,
which, we  hope, can serve as a basis for a deeper understanding of
intermediation between demand and supply more generally. We
do so by answering the following questions: What needs for inter-
mediation do public organisations have when they ask for, buy and
adopt products and services that are novel to them? How do these
needs translate into speciﬁc functions of intermediation in differ-
ent procurement situations and what are the corresponding roles
of intermediation?
To answer these questions, the paper ﬁrst presents and
mobilises various existing conceptualisations of intermediation in
innovation more generally as a starting point for the empirical
analysis (Section 2.1). It then establishes a concept of challenges
in public procurement of innovation as deﬁned above as a basis
for understanding speciﬁc intermediation needs, differentiating
between situations in which public procurement triggers an inno-
vation and those in which it responds to an innovation offered.
While both situations share some challenges, they have somewhat
different functional requirements and therefore different needs for
intermediation and support (Section 2.2). The paper then explores
two empirical examples of active intermediation (Section 3), both
situated within a complex public sector setting – the National
Health Service (NHS) in England. We  have chosen the English NHS
as it is a multi-layered organisation which has long been criticised
for not being able to reap the most out of the innovations offered
and not being demanding enough in asking for and adopting inno-
vation (Greenhalgh et al., 2004; Phillips et al., 2007; Wanless, 2002).
In this complex and challenging setting, we  ﬁrst explore how an
intermediary organisation supported a case of public procurement
of innovation characterised by a complicated need deﬁnition, com-
plex market interaction and the triggering of a novel solution. The
second case is an attempt to enable the adoption of an existing tech-
nology through intermediation. An in-depth analysis of these two
cases allows us to illustrate and explore the breadth of the functions
of intermediation. By doing so, we develop a more general concept
to understand intermediation in public procurement of innovation
(Section 4). Even if limited to public procurement, this concept can,
we believe, also be useful to better understand the under-explored
issue of private buying of innovation. The conclusions highlight the
need for a step-change in our understanding of intermediation in
innovation in order to capture the complexity of demand interme-
diation, and to discuss the concrete implications for the practice
of public procurement of innovation and for policy that seeks to
mobilise procurement to spur innovation.2. Conceptual background and literature review
To bring some order in the complexity of intermediation needs
and functions within the procurement of innovation, we  follow a
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wo-step approach. First, we turn to the general intermediation
iterature to understand the different functions of intermedia-
ion in innovation. Second, we deﬁne those challenges in public
rocurement innovation that in turn determine the need for inter-
ediation. This then provides the initial framework with which we
nalyse our cases and deﬁne intermediation needs and options for
he public procurement of innovation.
.1. Innovation intermediation
The common nucleus for innovation intermediation is that it
rovides a link between at least two entities which need to con-
ect in order to generate or adopt innovation, but which do not do
o sufﬁciently without having a linking device or linking support
Howells, 2006; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008, 2009; van Lente et al.,
003; Winch and Courtney, 2007). Intermediation can be direct,
ringing actors together and supporting their interaction, or indi-
ect, enabling and supporting actors to better understand others,
heir preferences, interests and skill set as well as the object of the
ransfer, i.e. knowledge, technological artefacts, products, etc.
Intermediation serves a large variety of roles, and has been
onceptualised and analysed in various streams of literature. Inter-
ediation is increasingly seen and conceptualised at a systems
evel, whereby intermediaries are not so much brokers between
istinct parties, but instruments to support systemic functions in
nnovation systems (Hekkert et al., 2007) or the directed change
f socio-technical systems (van Lente et al., 2003). While we  will
rgue later on that system level intermediation is needed in public
rocurement, we start with an actor-centric rather than a systems
erspective, as our empirical and conceptual starting points are
bout distinct organisations as moderators and brokers between
istinct parties, only to generalise our ﬁndings towards system
evel considerations later on.
Within this actor-centric perspective, we can build on two  func-
ional differentiations provided by (Howells, 2006) and van Lente
t al. (2003). First, Howells (2006) distinguishes four basic functions
f innovation intermediation:
1) supporting diffusion and technology transfer. This ﬁts our
broader understanding of innovation and intermediation as
outlined above, whereby intermediaries inﬂuence the deci-
sion of buyers through various intelligence activities (e.g.
information dissemination, evaluation), by supporting the
transferability of an innovation and the actual interaction in
the process of buyings
2) enabling innovation in the context of organisational innovation
management;
3) providing a general infrastructure for bridging within systems
and across networks in a broader, systemic sense (e.g. funding
organisation bridging between policy and research performers
(Lynn et al., 1996, p. 97);
4) enabling speciﬁc systems and networks functions (Howells,
2006), mainly through specialist service organisations, such as
knowledge intensive business services (Miles et al., 1995).
Second, van Lente et al. (2003) distinguish between three major
ypes of intermediation. This partly overlaps with Howells (2006)
bove, but it highlights three aspects that are important in our
ontext. First, and most appropriate for our purposes, the authors
tress the diffusion and transfer aspect from the perspective of the
emand side, as their ﬁrst type of intermediation is demand articu-
ation. Intermediation helps to articulate innovation needs in terms
f technology, knowledge, funding and policy. In their second type
f intermediation, van Lente et al. (2003) accentuate the dynamic
nd procedural aspect of intermediation: intermediation is seen as
rucial in the formation of actor networks and facilitating linkagesicy 45 (2016) 414–426
between relevant actors (scanning, scoping, ﬁltering, and match-
making of possible cooperation partners). In their third intermedi-
ation type, innovation process management, intermediation is about
learning over time, enhancing “alignment and learning of the multi-
actor network, which involves facilitating learning and cooperation
in the innovation process” (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009, p. 851).
This sketch of the variety of intermediation lays the ground
for zooming into the aspects of intermediation that relate to the
complex setting of procurement of innovation in public sector
organisations. Two  most important dimensions from the con-
ceptualisations above are “diffusion and technology transfer”
and “demand articulation” respectively. Intermediaries have been
found in many studies to be important determinants of the direc-
tion and speed of adoption (Winch and Courtney, 2007). Much
research has focused on the ways in which intermediaries actively
interact with and support the selling ﬁrm in exploiting the mar-
ket, through trying to understand the potential of technologies,
products and services for the broader market and supporting the
marketing efforts of the seller (Hargadon, 1998; Lichtenthaler and
Ernst, 2008; Morgan and Crawford, 1996). Much of the work
done by intermediaries for the suppliers is in effect a reac-
tion to their “internal limitations” as they extend their “own
resources for identifying technology commercialization opportu-
nities” (Lichtenthaler and Ernst, 2008, p. 1006).
Zooming in even further, towards the heart of our interest,
we ﬁnd various ways in which intermediaries broker between
supplier and buyer and intervene in the adoption decision and imple-
mentation process of buyers.  To better conceptualise the role of
intermediaries from the perspective of the buyers, we take advantage
of Bessant and Rush (1995) who  have articulated seven functions
for the purchase of technology to which intermediaries can con-
tribute: (1) recognition of requirements for the technology (in other
words: understanding the need), (2) exploring the range of solu-
tions, (3) comparison of solutions, (4) selection, (5) acquisition, (6)
implementation, and (7) operating and learning (in other words,
upgrading the skill base of buyers to perform complex acquisitions
themselves). Fig. 1 situates the dimension of the buyer–supplier
intermediation in the broader framework of innovation intermedi-
ation.
This simpliﬁed framework translates into a range of different
concrete activities of intermediaries. Intermediaries help “in deﬁn-
ing and selecting the needs of the client in relation to innovation”
(Díaz-Puente et al., 2009, p. 368), i.e. they can support the internal
understanding of the need in a “diagnostic role” (Bessant and Rush,
1995, p. 102). Intermediaries can help to identify potential solutions
or partners to deliver the solution; they scan and collect data and
evaluate performance, and disseminate data and ﬁndings about the
potential supply side solution(s). Intermediaries create awareness
and transparency by providing information about the technological
and business opportunities offered by an innovation (Díaz-Puente
et al., 2009; Hargadon and Sutton, 1997; Lynn et al., 1996; Mantel
and Rosegger, 1987; Watkins and Horley, 1986; Wolpert, 2002).
Intermediaries thus translate from one context to the other, and,
overall, create market enabling communication and trust between
the parties.
With regards to the actual process of buying, intermediaries can
be involved in supporting the buyer to make the actual selection
and buying decision (Mantel and Rosegger, 1987) and in the subse-
quent process in formalising interaction and supporting concrete
negotiations between partners during the entire process (Shohet
and Prevezer, 1996) up to the actual purchase and adoption.
This leads us towards an important aspect of intermediation,
that is, activities conducted by the intermediary only for one party
rather than at the interface (Howells, 2006, p. 724). This is rel-
evant in two  ways. First, intermediation can be linked to, even
be based upon, a one-party consultancy (van Lente et al., 2003).
J. Edler, J. Yeow / Research Policy 45 (2016) 414–426 417
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(Fig. 1. Buyer–su
o enable linkages here means to address the capabilities of the
ctors that are to be linked (Lichtenthaler and Ernst, 2008). Second,
nabling systematic decision making within organisations, espe-
ially large organisations, involves an element of intermediation
etween different internal organisational units. Intermediaries can
ridge normative and cognitive gaps not only between organisa-
ions, but between different organisational units.
This points to a ﬁnal, largely underexplored aspect. Intermedi-
ries can contribute to the building up of relational, managerial and
ntelligence capability on both sides, especially within the buying
rganisation. By doing so, they not only enable distinct transactions,
ut also enhance transactional capabilities more generally. For
xample, referring to diffusion programmes in innovation policies
n the 1980s, Bessant and Rush (1995, p. 99; 103) claim that con-
ultancies as intermediaries in the adoption process contributed to
he management capabilities of the consulted partners. However,
he literature on intermediaries is strangely thin when it comes to
he long-term learning effect on the abilities of all actors involved.
he contribution of intermediaries not only in supporting others by
roviding systemic and managerial capabilities, but in building up
hose capabilities within their partner organisations appears to be
nderexplored.
Against this background of intermediary functions, we now
eed to establish the speciﬁc challenges in the public procurement
f innovation that constitute the needs for intermediation.
.2. Challenges of public procurement
The literature on public procurement of innovation has identi-
ed which factors concerning the process and capabilities of the
uying organisation are conducive to buying and adopting innova-
ion in the public sector (Edler et al., 2005; Edquist et al., 2000; Izsak
nd Edler, 2011; Rolfstam, 2013; Rolfstam et al., 2009; Tsipouri
t al., 2009; Yeow et al., 2011). To establish those enabling factors
oses severe challenges for buying organisations and opens up pos-
ibilities – and needs – for intermediation to support. In general, the
ost important challenges for public procurement of innovationsre related to:
1) understanding and assessing the market and its opportunities,
both in terms of what is already offered and in terms of what intermediation.
the market could deliver if asked for by the public buyer (Edler
et al., 2005);
(2) being able to understand one’s need and the functional improve-
ments possible through innovation (Edler and Gee, 2013);
(3) establishing incentive structures that reﬂect the risk–reward dis-
tribution, to ensure that those organisational units that bear
the risk also share some of the efﬁciency or reputational gains
associated with innovation. Moreover, innovation procurement
needs capabilities and procedures to overcome risk aversion
through risk management approaches (Tsipouri et al., 2009;
Wilkinson et al., 2006);
(4) being able to implement the innovation and change organisational
procedures, routines and capacities needed to do so (Kyratsis
et al., 2010; Rolfstam et al., 2011; Rye and Kimberly, 2007).
Those functional needs in innovation procurement ask for
internal skills, capabilities and incentive structures, as well as
for inter-organisational (challenge 1, understanding markets) and
intra-organisational coordination (challenges 2–4). Poor inter-
organisational interaction is a real bottleneck. A survey of 800
suppliers to the UK public sector found that out of a list of 17
variables inﬂuencing the public procurement process, “early inter-
action with the procuring organisation” was the second most
important factor encouraging public procurement of innovation
(Uyarra et al., 2014); only the explicit demand for innovation in
tender documents was  regarded to be even more important. At the
same time, only 35% of the responding suppliers to the public sec-
tor experience early interaction with public bodies in procurement
processes. More worryingly, when asked about the signiﬁcance of
13 obstacles for selling innovation to the public sector, 45% of sup-
pliers said that the lack of interaction with the procuring body was
a very signiﬁcant bottleneck, the second highest after “too much
emphasis on price”. Finally, only a minority of suppliers to the pub-
lic sector assessed the knowledge of public organisations relating
to supplier products and related markets as well as their ability
to make use of the whole supply chain in that market positively
(Uyarra et al., 2013, 2014).
The challenge of intra-organisational coordination stems, inter
alia, from a considerable level of internal fragmentation of functions
(Uyarra and Flanagan, 2010; Wilkinson et al., 2006). There is rarely
a broad match or sufﬁcient coordination within buying organisa-
tions between those actors who  conduct the purchase in technical
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above (see also Bergek, 2014; Fagerberg, 2014), it is considered to
be an innovation in this study as it is new to the buying and adopt-
ing organisation and, if adopted, it has a strongly disruptive effect
2 For a comprehensive review of adoption barriers in the NHS, see Robert et al.
(2009) and York Health Economics Consortium (2009).
3 For example, the NHS introduced an online tool to help increase the scale and
pace of innovation adoption in the NHS, http://www.institute.nhs.uk/option,com18 J. Edler, J. Yeow / Resear
erms (i.e. procurers), those who are responsible to commission
t, those who have the overall responsibility to deliver the service
nd those who might be internal users of the solution bought. This
nternal differentiation is compounded by “silo-budgeting”, where
he budgetary responsibilities on the one hand and the locus of the
ctual use and beneﬁt of a product on the other hand do not match.
Further, challenges for the buying organisation are determined
y what organisational adaptations are needed in the buying
rganisations when adopting an innovation. Highly disruptive
nnovations mean that public organisations have to learn at all lev-
ls, adapt their capabilities and, in the extreme, establish entirely
ew organisational processes and routines. In principle, the more
isruptive an innovation, the higher the need for learning, internal
oordination and change management and thus the more severe
he challenges mentioned above.
As previously mentioned in the introduction, challenges also
iffer between triggering and responsive demand for innovation
Allman et al., 2011, p. 27; Miles et al., 2009, p. 17). Responsive
rocurement is determined by the willingness and ability of an
rganisation to absorb and utilise products and services that are
ffered to them in the marketplace, but that are new to the buy-
ng organisation. The need of a public buyer is not the origin of
he innovation, but important for its diffusion, and public orga-
isations responsive to innovations are important assets in the
emand conditions of countries (Allman et al., 2011, p. 27; Miles
t al., 2009, p. 17). The main speciﬁc challenges here are assessing
he business case for an innovative solution, i.e. the added value and
eliability of an innovation for the established functions, creating
 consensus across the organisation concerning the added beneﬁt,
nd the ability to implement the innovation (including convinc-
ng citizens should the innovation be critical to the delivery of the
ublic service).
When public organisations express a need that cannot ade-
uately be met  by an existing product or service, they trigger
he generation of an innovation. The innovative solution required
o fulﬁl the need can be generated by suppliers (alone) or in
o-operation between the public organisation (as user) and the
uppliers, where interactions can extend into user-producer inter-
ctions to actually co-produce the solution up to a prototype (as
xplained in the work within the von Hippel tradition, e.g. Prandelli
t al., 2008; Von Hippel, 1986). In addition to the challenges for
esponsive procurement, triggering an innovation through pro-
urement means that public organisations need to be able to
nderstand, deﬁne and clearly express their future needs. They also
eed to be able to approach the marketplace and to interact with
otential producers in a way that stirs market interest. For produc-
rs, it is important to be close to the early signals of sophisticated
ustomers, to be able to communicate and co-produce the knowl-
dge and technologies needed to satisfy the needs expressed by
otential demanders and to support the early testing and imple-
entation phase.
. Intermediation in action: public procurement in the
nglish public health sector
.1. The setting: the NHS as procurer of innovation
It has been considered that the National Health Service in
ngland, as indeed in most OECD countries, is in principle in a
ery good position to stimulate innovation by acting as the ﬁrst
ustomer and early adopter of new innovations, setting clear and
trategic directions and better communicating where and how it is
eeking to procure innovative solutions in the future (DH, 2011).
owever, the NHS in England has generally been found to be a late
nd slow adopter of innovation (Wanless, 2002). This has largelyicy 45 (2016) 414–426
been attributed to the complex landscape of the NHS with mul-
tiple levels of governance, multi-entry points for the purchase of
new technologies and the internal functional differentiation neces-
sitating a high level of coordination for purchase decisions and
adoption processes (Phillips et al., 2007). Further, barriers relating
to the adoption of innovative solutions in the NHS have been con-
sistently highlighted in the literature and appear to be associated
with asymmetries in interaction, information and capability (Ferlie
et al., 2000, 2005; Kyratsis et al., 2010; Liddell et al., 2008; Rosen
and Mays, 1998).2 The role of and opportunity for the procurement
of innovation in the NHS has come to the forefront in recent years
and many steps and initiatives have been taken within the health
system in the UK to harness the potential that procuring innovation
could bring (DH, 2009; HITF, 2004; Phillips et al., 2007).3
3.2. Two empirical cases
3.2.1. Case selections
Against this background, we  selected two distinct cases within
the English NHS that represent different procurement situations,
institutional settings and thus procurement challenges: the pro-
curement of a technology to monitor cardiac activity during surgery
(Doppler Monitor) to be used in hospital surgery settings, and the
design and procurement of a new blood donor chair by the NHS
Blood and Transplant Service.
The cases were selected after a broad scan of public procure-
ment activities across the English NHS. The two cases were chosen
to represent two different intermediation situations. The ﬁrst case
is about the attempts of buying and adopting an existing innova-
tive technology for the ﬁrst time on a larger scale outside dedicated
pilot case settings, while the second one is about triggering and
buying an innovation to fulﬁl a speciﬁc need. The case studies
were conducted in 2010 and 2011. We  examined a broad range
of primary documents reﬂecting the case process and conducted
twenty-four semi-structured interviews with context experts (in
NHS procurement and NHS innovation) and key actors from the
intermediary organisations, from different layers and function-
alities across the buying organisations (including those actually
using the innovation), from the supplying ﬁrms and relevant indus-
try associations. In addition, we  conducted ethnographic research
observing important stages of the interactions and processes while
they were unfolding.
3.2.2. First time procurement of a disruptive solution
The CardioQ-Oesophageal Doppler Monitor (hereafter referred
to as the Doppler) is a technology that assesses the cardiac out-
put of a patient to guide appropriate administration of ﬂuid and
drugs during surgery. It presents a less invasive way to measure
cardiac output4 and there is convincing evidence of its clinical and
economic beneﬁt5 (NICE, 2011), not to mention delivering bet-
ter patient outcomes and improving the patient experience. The
Doppler is not a new technology per se; it already exists on the
market. However, in line with our broad deﬁnition of innovationspread and adoption/Itemid,6946.html.
4 Compared to the use of a central venous line/catheterisation.
5 It is estimated that the use of the Doppler could save the NHS around £1100
per patient, based on a 7.5-day hospital stay and in comparison to a central venous
catheter, leading to a potential saving throughout the NHS of over £410 m.
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Box 1: The NHS Technology Adoption Centre (NTAC)
The NHS Technology Adoption Centre (NTAC) was established
in 2007 with the remit of providing a more systematic approach
to the adoption of technology in the NHS, particularly those
that were under-utilised within the NHS. It enables organi-
sations to better understand and overcome their adoption
barriers, and helps to support the implementation of innovative
technologies in NHS organisations. It also assists technology
and diagnostics suppliers to navigate the complexities of the
NHS. In 2013 it moved into the National Institute for Health and
Clinical Excellence, NICE (see Box 2).
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have the dedicated time and resources to devote to take the adop-
tion forward, for example, by providing help and experience in
writing a business case, as well as mobilising the relevant people in
7 The IPP were mandatory plans for each national UK department to spell out the
innovation procurement strategy. A change of government subsequently led to their
disbandment.or organisational practices as it signiﬁcantly changes work prac-
ices of different clinicians and the delivery of medicine and patient
are. Despite its beneﬁts, it has not been rolled out or adopted as
idely as it could be, and there is only anecdotal evidence that
ome hospitals in the UK have used it. The main barriers iden-
iﬁed in our interviews with clinicians, roadshow attendees and
rocurers and also expressed in a feasibility study conducted by
he National Technology Adoption Centre (NTAC, 2010, see Box 1)
or the purchase and adoption have been resistance by clinicians
particularly anaesthetists, who are often trained and experienced
n using a different technology or method of ﬂuid management)
nd a lack of training and resources available to apply the new
echnology. Furthermore, there were barriers stemming from the
nstitutional complexity within an NHS hospital setting, with its
ulti-layered governance and vastly complex functional differen-
iation (e.g. cardiology, paediatrics, emergency medicine, general
urgery), employing a wide range of healthcare professionals, from
octors to nurses and support staff. This resulted in a fragmented
nderstanding of the cost-beneﬁt of the Doppler, as it has different
onsequences for different functions and departments (i.e. sepa-
ate budgets held for theatres, anaesthetics, surgical procedures
nd palliative care). While the Doppler enables and necessitates a
e-design of previously unlinked enhanced recovery pathways, this
nstitutional complexity stood in the way of a holistic understand-
ng of the cost-beneﬁt and business case.
There had previously been two large initiatives to try and tackle
he problem of adoption and diffusion of the Doppler. First, in
007, NTAC supported its implementation in three pilot NHS sites
o understand and overcome the barriers to widespread adoption.
n this pilot study, issues of silo-budgeting, often widespread in
he NHS, were overcome by mobilising high-level managerial buy-
n through getting Finance Directors to approve inter-department
unding. Similarly, NTAC reported that a lack of conﬁdence among
naesthetists to use the technology was addressed through a
tructured training programme delivered by the supplier. NTAC
ubsequently produced a How-To-Why-To Guide (NTAC, 2010) that
ospitals and Trusts could download and use as guidance to support
heir own adoption of the Doppler (or similar) technology.6
The second initiative to overcome adoption problems for the
oppler was undertaken in the framework of the Innovation Tech-
ology Adoption Procurement Programme (iTAPP) set up by the
epartment of Health (DH) in 2009. iTAPP was an initiative of the
H’s Procurement Investment and Commercial Division (PICD) in
ollaboration with NTAC and the medical technology industry, to
acilitate the procurement, implementation, adoption and diffusion
f innovative medical devices (as part of the National Innovation
6 In addition, NTAC also created an ‘adoption pack’ with more prescriptive guid-
nce about the steps an acute organisation needs to take in order to start using, or
ncrease their use of, these technologies.icy 45 (2016) 414–426 419
Procurement Plan)7 in a more coherent manner across the NHS
through the ten English regional Strategic Health Authorities8
(DH, 2009). The initiative was  embedded within the local imple-
mentation of a broader NHS strategic agenda to improve Quality,
Innovation, Productivity and Prevention (QIPP) within the NHS.
Industry suppliers of health technologies and products were invited
to recommend innovations already on the market or in the pipeline
that could increase quality and reduce cost for the NHS if rolled out;
the Doppler being one of them. The iTAPP team then produced a
long list of technologies and each SHA selected up to three tech-
nologies to take forward to implementation. A Regional Innovation
Fund was also created alongside to support faster innovation and
more widespread diffusion of best practice among (and through-
out) each of the ten regions. Up to £15,000 was  available to assist
regional SHAs in adopting any of the technologies on the iTAPP list.
In 2011, the East Midlands SHA selected the Doppler from the
iTAPP list as one of the three technologies to implement and diffuse
in its region as part of its delivery of the Enhanced Recovery After
Surgery (ERAS) Programme. NTAC was  commissioned by DH to sup-
port the SHA in pushing the adoption of the Doppler throughout the
region using their experience with the pilot implementation and in
line with their role as a technology enabler.9 The process was ﬁrst
approved at SHA level by the regional Clinical Cabinet, Planned Care
Board and various Trust Chief Executives in the region. This, how-
ever, only functioned as guidance for the lower levels where the
actual budget holders for purchasing decisions sit (in the hospitals
within Trusts). An implementation project team was put together
consisting of people with different specialities and from different
areas of healthcare. Their goal was to engage various stakeholders
(e.g. surgery leads, anaesthetists, procurement leads, ERAS Pro-
gramme  leads within Trusts) through a series of Trust-based road
shows to showcase the evidence base of the technology and to
provide support for the negotiation in what many interviewees
describe as the “mineﬁeld” of NHS procurement to ﬁnally enable
its adoption and diffusion. A project manager within East Midlands
SHA was appointed, and worked closely with an NTAC technology
implementation manager to develop an overarching implementa-
tion plan across all Trusts and hospitals, and subsequent individual
implementation plans for hospitals that are keen to take the project
forward. There was also a clinical lead in the project team whose
role was to act as a ‘clinical champion’.
One of the main challenges encountered by the implementation
team was the view by clinicians that the procurement process was
often too bureaucratic and complicated; a point repeatedly stressed
by clinicians attending the road shows. Even in cases where the cli-
nicians were convinced of the beneﬁts of the Doppler, many of them
argued that the landscape was  too complex and they did not have
the knowledge or expertise (or time or inclination) to present the
relevant business case in the best way. Such a problem could be
overcome through the project implementation team, who  would8 This would be done through an SHA innovation lead located within each Author-
ity, who  is employed to deliver the SHA’s legal duty to promote innovation, raise the
proﬁle of innovation and encourage a more rapid adoption of innovation throughout
the NHS.
9 If a Trust or hospital commits to adopting and implementing the technology,
NTAC’s role would be to provide project support in terms of putting in place a local
champion that would run the project and also support other activities such as bring
together a team of representative stakeholders, getting a good baseline of metrics
in  place, establishing a proper project plan with deﬁned goals over a period of time,
and  formulating a communication plan.
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Box 2: The National Institute for Health and Clinical
Excellence (NICE)
The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE)
was set up as Special Health Authority funded by the Depart-
ment of Health in 1999 to reduce variation in the availability and
quality of NHS treatments and care. NICE develops evidence-
based guidelines on the most effective ways to diagnose, treat
and prevent disease and ill health. While NICE has a strong
history in setting standards for high-quality care in the NHS,
recommendations on drugs and guidance on public health,
more recently the institute has also provided guidance on med-
ical technologies with the objective of opening up access to
new or innovative medical technologies and devices on the
NHS. In 2013 NICE became a Non-Departmental Body with an
expanded remit to include guidance and quality standards in
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allow NHSBT to get a prototype of a bespoke design produced,
tested, and eventually procured. WIBGI is a formal process in which
relevant stakeholders are invited to participate in a workshop tosocial care.
he Trusts and hospitals to take things forward. Findings from the
TAC pilot study (NTAC, 2010) indicated that the development of
 strong business case was  essential to obtain senior management
upport to overcome the issue of silo budgeting. This was a point
f focus for the East Midlands SHA implementation team in this
econd initiative.
Consistent with ﬁndings from the NTAC pilot study, the imple-
entation team found that resistance to use of new technologies by
linicians, particularly anaesthetists, was prevalent (NTAC, 2010).
he majority of those interviewed stressed that clinical buy-in was
he most important yet most challenging barrier to overcome. This
as a view shared not only by hospital administrators and man-
gers, but also by clinicians themselves. In the pilot study, concerns
bout the technology were overcome through peer-led training
NTAC, 2010). In the case of the East Midlands SHA, an anaesthetist
onsultant was appointed as the clinical lead for the project, who
cted as a “champion” to help overcome this problem as it was
elt that having someone who “spoke their language” made the
vidence base more relevant to the clinicians.
In a complementary move, the National Institute for Clinical
xcellence (NICE – see Box 2) published guidance10 on the Doppler
MTG 3) and offered several tools to help organisations put the guid-
nce into practice. The SHA implementation team suggested that
ICE guidance might act as an incentive for those who are sitting
n the fence and act as a lever for those who are really keen to use
t but struggle to gain the support of their Trusts.
To date, a lot of progress has been made with regards to the ERAS
rogramme and the intermediation has brought about awareness;
owever, at the time of writing there was still no concrete commit-
ent from a speciﬁc organisation within the region to take up the
ffer from NTAC to help them with the process of adopting the tech-
ology. Reasons cited by the implementation team and hospital
dministrators include persistent resistance of users in the operat-
ng theatre and of ﬁnancial directors to commit to this technology.
espite a clear economic and clinical case, the intermediation did
ot succeed in convincing the multiplicity of actors that need to
earn, adopt and act. Our data suggest that the main reasons for
his were the high learning costs at various levels, the fragmenta-
ion of responsibility for ﬁnances and for health beneﬁts, the lack
10 NICE produces guidance in ﬁve main areas, including medical technology
uidance (MTG). MTG  considers a single medical device or diagnostic technology
notiﬁed to NICE by manufacturers) which provides equivalent or enhanced clinical
utcomes at equivalent or reduced cost. The outcome is speciﬁc recommendations
n  the adoption of the technology; however “the speciﬁc recommendations on
ndividual technologies are not intended to limit use of other relevant technolo-
ies  which may offer similar advantages” (NICE, 2011, http://guidance.nice.org.uk/
TG3).icy 45 (2016) 414–426
of sufﬁcient involvement or pressure from the user group and the
absence of any pressure from the end beneﬁciaries (the patients).
While there has been some learning effect – the system has been
pushed and is now willing to consider innovation to tackle the issue
– there has not been a widespread adoption of a speciﬁc solution.
3.2.3. Procurement triggering innovation
NHS Blood and Transplant (NHSBT) is a special health author-
ity set up to provide a limited set of clearly deﬁned services
nationally (in this case for England and Wales). It is less frag-
mented and institutionally complex compared to an NHS Trust and
accountable directly to the NHSBT Board, but nonetheless has dif-
ferentiated service provision units and supporting functions such as
procurement. For many years, NHS Blood and Transplant searched
to procure a new blood donation chair to replace their current
beds, one that would ﬁt a modern environment, satisfy all the
health and safety issues and concerns, and improve their service
delivery efﬁciency.11 The search in the market was  unsuccessful;
several chairs with different designs existed in the market, many
were bought and trialled but none was  deemed suitable for the
organisation.12 Following a traditional procurement route, i.e. pur-
chasing ‘off-the-shelf’, had not worked. The inability to formulate
the concrete need and to articulate it to the market resulted in
several failed procurement attempts that wasted time, money and
resources. The organisation also tried to work with their incum-
bent supplier to design a new chair but to no success. There was a
concern by the Assistant Director of Nursing that a failure to pro-
cure a new chair to meet their changing needs could impact on
their service delivery efﬁciency. The idea to get a bespoke design
met  with resistance within NHSBT. The procurement team had
never done this and objected for fear of risk and costs. Further, they
were sceptical and questioned the strategy to go beyond what was
already in the market, doubting that there was  no product available
on the market that was  suitable and that could be purchased. The
procurement team did not understand why the user needs could
not just be written into a speciﬁcation that would mobilise a sup-
plier to develop and provide it. In 2009, the Assistant Director of
Nursing became aware of the National Innovation Centre (NIC; see
Box 3) and its role in the NHS innovation process and realised they
could assist NHSBT in getting a bespoke chair designed, built and
procured.
From a clinical and operational perspective, the Assistant Direc-
tor of Nursing had a clear idea about what functionalities the chair
would have to deliver, but was unable to translate that into clear
technical speciﬁcations. She lacked the necessary skills for this, and
could not assess how the various functions would be best delivered.
NIC presented to NHSBT the possible options available to procure
a new chair, making sure they had already considered ‘conven-
tional’ procurement routes and framework agreements. NIC then
introduced a ﬁve-step process (known as WIBGI13), which wouldidentify, validate and rank the clinical needs of the innovation
11 Blood donation is conducted in a variety of locations and environments, e.g.
mobile sessions, donor centres, blood mobiles, and would also be either whole blood
or component donation sessions. Therefore, some of the requirements for the new
chair related to ease of mobility, storage, transport, comfort and safety for those
using it (both the donor and the staff). Improving faint rates was also high on the
agenda; research has found that collecting blood in a horizontal position (i.e. on a
bed) was  not good clinical practice.
12 Purchasing an existing chair on the market that did not wholly meet its needs
would mean signiﬁcant compromises to NHSBT standards and strategic objectives
around donor safety.
13 WIBGI stands for “Wouldn’t It Be Great If. . .”.
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Box 3: The National Innovation Centre (NIC)
The NIC was part of the NHS Institute for Innovation and
Improvement (NHSI) and was established in 2004 as part of a
wider initiative to address the issue of the NHS being a late and
slow adopter of innovation. Its role was to work with innovators
to develop a product or process innovation, and subsequently
work with NHS customers to get that innovation adopted and
used. While procurement was not within the remit of NIC, at the
time they had been granted special powers by the Secretary of
State for Health to support the generation of innovative solu-
tions. The main procedure with which this should be achieved
was for them to design and support a so-called pre-commercial
procurement (PCP) process that would lead to a prototype and
a clear understanding of needs as well as of what would techni-
cally be feasible. NIC considered two paths to the development
of technological innovation that can beneﬁt the health sector
– reactive and proactive paths. The reactive model aimed to
“receive” innovative ideas and solutions from industry, which
the NIC then supported through awarding funding for further
development or establishing contact with other experts or the
NHS for collaboration or to conduct trials. The proactive model
sought to develop a solution for a need and requirement which
the current marketplace could not meet.
Following a Review of Arm’s Length Bodies by the UK Coalition
government concluded that NHSI would be abolished in 2012.
Since January 2012, NIC has become an independent mutual
organisation, ICONIC. They continue to support innovators of
healthcare technology and work with NHS organisations to
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n question, ranging from those that are essential to those that
re “nice to have”. It has elements that are very similar to a pre-
ommercial procurement (PCP) approach,14 as it leads to the design
f a prototype solution, thereby reducing risk and allowing interac-
ion in the service provision process to ensure needs are clearly met.
owever, while PCP initiatives normally end with the production
f a prototype, rather than leading to a purchase of an innovative
olution, the objective of the NHSBT process was from the outset
o procure the designed chair on a larger scale, after initially test-
ng and trialling it on a smaller scale. Therefore, this is a case of a
rocurement that triggered innovation, with a design contest as an
nitial, separate step of the procurement process to reduce risk.
The need to get new blood donor chairs was established as
 strategic change project, and the NHSBT “Change Programme”
oard approved the initial prototype and testing phase. NIC then
upported NHSBT to conduct a ‘WIBGI’ workshop to identify, vali-
ate and rank the concrete clinical needs of the new chair. Using
his interactive approach allowed NHSBT to ﬁrstly specify require-
ents in a step-wise, iterative process that more fully reﬂected the
arious needs for the chair. NIC further conducted a formal needs
ssessment review, including a review of the existing and upcom-
ng market solutions. Based on the evidence, NIC concluded that
here was no technology already available on the market that could
eet NHSBT’s need, and this enabled NHSBT to move on to the next
tep of getting a bespoke product designed.
14 Pre-commercial procurement approaches, like the UK Small Business Research
nitiative, are programmes of open competitions whereby a “challenge” is set to
timulate the creation of innovative new products and services. They result in a
ully funded development contract between the winning company and government
epartment and give vital funding for the critical stage of product development,
deally resulting in a prototype of a commercial product or service. The actual PCP
oes not include the manufacturing and buying of the innovation (and thus PCP
chemes as such are not procurement of innovation), but the basic idea of PCP is
o  lead build up sufﬁcient interest in the prototype that was developed leading to
emand and purchase. For more information see Rigby (2016).icy 45 (2016) 414–426 421
NIC then approached two design houses with the new speciﬁ-
cation on behalf of NHSBT, and each was invited to produce several
designs for a chair that would meet the requirements as speci-
ﬁed so far. Subsequently, NHSBT commissioned one design from
each company to be turned into a prototype to be tested. A project
manager was  employed by NHSBT to oversee the management of
this testing phase and undertake any other work necessary, e.g.
preparing a business case, to proceed to the commercial procure-
ment stage. After a series of feedback loops with the design house
that won the competition, one prototype was successfully ﬁnalised.
Subsequently, NHSBT conducted a commercial procurement for a
small-scale order, which was  trialled by three teams over 12 weeks.
The process and outcomes were managed by the NHSBT project
manager. This was followed by a ﬁnal delivery for the full order of
chairs in December 2011, and the new chairs were rolled out to all
donation teams and are now fully operational in all units.
This entire process was  new to NHSBT, where previously prod-
ucts were chosen in traditional procurement procedures and
rolled out through the organisation without a proper trial and
improvement phase. Through separating the design phase and
the procurement phase of the new donation chair, this approach
allowed multiple speciﬁc service contracts to compete for the best
designs, established a close interaction between the public agency
and those working on a solution, and led to sharing the risks and
beneﬁts.
4. Analysis
4.1. Understanding intermediation
The two cases have illustrated the need for intermediation as
well as the beneﬁts and shortcomings of different intermediation
modes. Both cases have shown various different intermediation
roles throughout the procurement process, which were performed
not by one intermediator, but by different actors over time. Follow-
ing our initial framework of intermediation (Section 2.1) and the
challenges of innovation procurement (Section 2.2), the two cases
now allow us to understand and conceptualise intermediation in
the public procurement of innovation more systematically, with
implications for intermediation on the demand side of innovation
more generally.
In the case of procuring an existing innovation – the Doppler
case – we see an interplay of external and internal intermedia-
tion at different levels. The procurement and adoption challenge
in the Doppler case stemmed from the severe disruption in inter-
nal processes and skills, and thus high adaptation costs. First, the
iTAPP programme created awareness among the potential user
community about the availability of solutions and mobilised this
community to react to the solution offered. This was achieved
mainly by creating a forum and entry point for suppliers. Further,
there was an element of trust building which was based on an inter-
nal peer review procedure for the technologies on offer and through
the link to the activity of NTAC. The NTAC pilot provided the data
and demonstration needed to reduce the risk (NTAC, 2010). This
intermediary function produced codiﬁed, standardised references
and a process manual as a public good to be taken up by all (poten-
tial) buying organisations to be used in their business case and it
enabled internal communication about the added beneﬁt of new
technology. In a next step, NTAC provided more direct, one-to one
support for a bundle of buying organisations within one Strate-
gic Health Authority. The attempt here was  to insert technology,
market and process related competencies into the process. It also
supported an internal project management team that sought to link
and coordinate different constituencies across the different levels
within the public organisation and to act as process facilitator.
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economic uncertainty associated with market novelties. This ranges
from established products and services that are nonetheless novel
to the buying organisation (procurement responding to innovation)22 J. Edler, J. Yeow / Resear
Following the established seven-step model of intermediation
n the innovation purchase process as outlined by Bessant and Rush
1995, see Fig. 1), intermediation through NTAC and iTAPP in the
oppler case helped to recognise the requirements of the technol-
gy, explore the market and create awareness, compare solutions
nd selected a solution on the basis of a business case and a risk
ssessment. In the Doppler case, intermediation supported a dis-
ourse across levels and between units in the NHS region, combined
ith some strong leadership at trust level and buy-in at the regional
SHA) and national (DH) level.
Yet, acquisition, the next step, did not take place as broadly
nvisaged. The inbuilt institutional obstacles to innovation adop-
ion as outlined above still stood in the way of diffusion on
ny meaningful scale. While no longer a market novelty, the
oppler still required considerable change in actor capabilities
nd behaviour and presented challenges for organisational practice
nd ﬁnancial management in the adopting organisation. The main
ottleneck lay in the limited adjustment of user (i.e. clinicians)
apabilities and user learning. The structural problem was that the
ntermediation could not overcome the gaps produced by inter-
al functional differentiation, as the actual users were not involved
n the broader intermediation process. Furthermore, there was  an
nability to deﬁne a widely shared holistic business case that gave
he overall net beneﬁt of the Doppler priority over the learning
nd adaptation costs in various different departments. Together,
his resulted in insufﬁcient pressure on budget holders to actually
ake a purchase.
In the case of procurement that triggered innovation there were
dditional challenges for the functions of intermediation. The chal-
enges here stemmed not so much from internal disruption in
sing the new solution, but from the difﬁculty to deﬁne the con-
rete need, to convince the internal procurement function about
he need to have a new solution deﬁned and to interact with
he market. When procuring the blood donation chair, the main
hallenge was a sound understanding of the need as a prerequi-
ite to send signals to suppliers. Intermediation here meant using
arket players for the speciﬁcation of the need. Speciﬁcation of
he need involved not just a clear cut technical list of require-
ents, but a process that allowed for joint learning between the
esign company and the various actor groups within the buy-
ng organisation (NHSBT). Intermediation through the NIC brought
ogether the relevant stakeholders in a session that resulted in
n explicit deﬁnition of the clinical needs. On that basis, the NIC
urther conducted due diligence and identiﬁed suitable compa-
ies for what essentially was a design contest. The NIC provided
rocess expertise linked to the technical expertise available in
he marketplace rather than providing it themselves. Furthermore,
anaged the early phase of interaction between the buyer and
esigner (and subsequent producer). Importantly, this ﬁrst phase
as complemented by an internal project manager in NHSBT who
ook over the external intermediation with the design company.
e also intensiﬁed the internal intermediation by establishing a
eries of feedback loops and intra-organisational interactions that
elped to reﬁne the design, bundle expertise and create further
wareness across the buying organisation. The main feature in
his intermediation process was process learning that resulted
n a change of procurement practice more generally. As a result
f working in this new way with NIC, NHSBT saw an oppor-
unity to use the NIC process to procure other pieces of kit
o support blood donation. The result was the development of
 Session Environment Design Authority (SEDA) within NHSBT,
hich subsequently took on some of the intermediary functionshrough testing of innovations and trust building exercises. An
xternal intermediation not only succeeded in delivering a new
echnology, it also led to institutional learning for future pro-
esses.icy 45 (2016) 414–426
4.2. Conceptualising intermediation needs
The analysis above in conjunction with the initial concep-
tualisation (Sections 2.1 and 2.2) allows us to synthesise more
systematically the requirements for intermediation in PPI. In any
concrete case of public procurement of innovation, the interme-
diation need and the success of procurement depend on a large
number of idiosyncratic conditions as well as the existing capabil-
ities and governance processes within the buying organisation to
fulﬁl the learning and linkage requirements.
We  have seen from both cases, that buying something that is
novel to the organisation necessitates some basic level of cross-
organisational communication and co-ordination about the added
overall beneﬁt of the innovation and need for internal organisational
adaptations, sufﬁcient evidence of its technical reliability and its long
term advantageous value for money proposition and basic adjustment
of user capabilities.
The discussion of our two cases, however, suggests that the
learning and adaptation costs, and thus the nature of the concrete
intermediation needs, are strongly inﬂuenced by two  conditions:
(1) the degree of internal organisational disruption and (2) the need
to specify internal needs and interact with the market to ﬁnd new,
tailored solutions.
The case of the Doppler best illustrates a high degree of inter-
nal organisational disruption caused by the purchase and use of the
innovation. A market solution already existed, with demonstrated
technical feasibility and an established business case and thus lit-
tle demands for additional external intermediation. However, the
adoption and use of the Doppler was disruptive for the organisation.
This posed some severe internal challenges15 in terms of:
• high demand on changes of role descriptions, routines and practices
across parts of the organisation,
• correspondingly high demand on internal coordination at all lev-
els of the organisation to prepare for that change and re-deﬁne
interactions and interfaces,
• access for all units and individuals affected to the available intel-
ligence about the reliability and the business case of the solution
and translation into the conditions of the organisation,
• help to reduce the risk of organisational adoption failure.
The limits of intermediation in cases of high internal disruption
have been shown in the Doppler case. The multiple intermedia-
tion efforts did not overcome the adoption bottlenecks stemming
from deeply rooted institutional features in multi-layered organi-
sations, such as a disconnect between strategic guidance (SHA, DH),
budget holders/decision makers, users (clinicians) and beneﬁciar-
ies (patients), compounded by a lack of adjustment pressure that
would have to be exerted by binding authoritative power. Inter-
nal linkages, support for learning and some additional pressure on
the actor groups involved, e.g. performance indicators that force
budget holders and clinicians to adopt, would have been needed to
overcome the “normative and cognitive gaps” (Howells, 2006) and
turn around the innovation-hampering incentive structures within
public organisations.
The second condition that determining intermediation require-
ments is the need to deﬁne internal needs and master technical and15 To be sure, the blood donor case also needed some basic internal adjustment of
routines of nurses and technical staff responsible for setting up mobile blood donor
processes, but those adjustments were relatively minor and did not necessitate a
re-deﬁnition of internal functions.
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to situations in which the needs of the buying organisation can
only be met  if suppliers generate a novel solution altogether (pro-
curement triggering an innovation). The blood donor chair case
illustrates the speciﬁc demands on intermediation if an organisa-
tion seeks a solution that is not yet available on the market.  This case
was characterised by:
• a demand for high sophistication to understand one’s (future) need
and market options already available;
• a process of pro-active, sustained interaction between buyer and
suppliers (both established and potentially new), with feedback
loops and de facto a co-construction of the solution;
• repeated interaction with citizens/patients to support internal
learning;
• development of a tailored business case justifying the purchase,
• a process of internal coordination sustained over time, including
the various functions involved in deﬁning the need for a novel solu-
tion and those responsible for the actual procurement process,
• all of which helped to reduce technical, performance and eco-
nomical risks (in addition to internal adoption risks as outlined
above).
These observations now allow us to conceptualise the different
roles of intermediation in different procurement situations.
4.3. Conceptualising intermediation roles
Based on the case discussions and a more systematic
understanding of intermediation needs, four different roles for
intermediation in public procurement of innovation can ﬁnally be
distinguished (Table 1).16 Again, the importance for those roles is
slightly different between triggering and responsive procurement,
and it will depend on the level of existing abilities to learn and link
within the buying organisation and on the level of disruption the
innovation would cause. Further, these intermediation roles can be
played by different intermediaries.
First, intermediaries can actually perform the procurement pro-
cess, partly or entirely. As in the case of the donor chair, this will
be reasonable for disruptive innovations that need to be gener-
ated by suppliers and necessitate sophisticated market interaction
that cannot be provided by internal capabilities and structures.
Second, intermediaries as brokers provide linkages as the classic
“middleman” (Howells, 2006) between the buyer and the (poten-
tial) suppliers and – often neglected – between organisational units
within the organisation. In our donor chair case, the project man-
ager employed had this function through the latter stage of the
process. Third, the intermediary as content expert would not link
actors, but provide the necessary intelligence especially for the buy-
ing organisation to deﬁne needs, to assess options, and to inform
their business case and the internal and external interactions. This
was the case with the NTAC and iTAPP process in the Doppler
case. Fourth, the intermediary can be a trainer,  empowering the
organisation that is supported to build up the process capacities
which subsequently allow the buying organisation to learn and to
link more independently. This transfer of intermediation capability
through the system, provided through intermediation processes,
means in essence that external intermediation would work best
if it renders itself redundant in the process.17 While this was  not
16 This typology of intermediation roles is based on, but exceeds Bessant and Rush
(1995, pp. 101–102).
17 As our cases are conﬁned to individual organisations, we have not expanded the
concept to situations of cooperative procurement, whereby intermediation would
have  to support the coordination of a group of purchasers, and requirements and
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he explicit remit of the NIC in the donor chair case, the transfer of
rocurement skills is exactly what happened.
. Conclusions
In this paper we have analysed intermediation to link demand
nd supply in the procurement of innovation and further concep-
ualised the needs for and roles of innovation intermediation. We
ave focused on public procurement and on the perspective of the
ublic buyer. We  have initially claimed, based on existing empirical
iterature, that intermediation is crucial for procuring innovation,
ut entirely underdeveloped in the existing literature both on inno-
ation intermediation and on public procurement of innovation.
Our discussion has shown that we need to broaden our under-
tanding of intermediation to support the initiation and diffusion
f innovation in the marketplace. When analysing and when sup-
orting the procurement of products (or services) that are novel
or the buying organisation, we need to differentiate on various
imensions: we  need to look carefully if the purchase is about an
xisting solution that is new to the public organisation, or if the
rocurement triggers the generation of an innovation, and we need
o understand how disruptive the innovation that is bought is for
he practices across the buying organisation. Our cases have shown
hat the challenges increase if the procurement triggers the gener-
tion of an innovation and with increasing level and breadth of
nternal disruption it causes. We  also need to distinguish the dif-
erent roles intermediation can play and match those roles against
he organisational capabilities that exist in the buying organisa-
ion and the internal diversity and complexity of that organisation.
nly if we take all those dimensions into account can we  assess
he need for intermediation both externally and within the organi-
ation. Our discussion has also emphasised that intermediation is
ot only about the linking of actors, but also about the enabling of
ctors to link.
The multi-dimensional differentiation of intermediation needs
nd functions that we have offered here complements the general
iterature on intermediation that has as yet failed to zoom in sufﬁ-
iently into procurement processes (e.g. Howells, 2006; van Lente
t al., 2003) or to differentiate between different types of innova-
ion and demand situations (Bessant and Rush, 1995). The next step
ould be to test and further develop the intermediation function in
he process of asking for and buying an innovation more generally,
specially with regards to large private organisations.
The intermediation requirements identiﬁed in this article are
anifold, and public organisations can be supported through pol-
cy initiatives. In both cases we have seen that public procurement
f a product (or a service) that is novel to the buying organisation is
haracterised by capability gaps and poor linkages. The technologi-
al, economic and process capabilities that public bodies require
o understand what their need is (as demonstrated especially in
he donor chair case), and to be able to ask for, adopt and use
n innovation (as demonstrated especially in the Doppler case)
re considerable, and they change over time. We  have seen that
uyer organisations need to link different internal stakeholders. In
oth cases, the buying organisation needed support to link with
he market actors which (potentially) supply the innovation. Even
f organisations in principle were willing to procure more inno-
ation, and even if individual actors and units have sophisticated
apabilities, they are overwhelmed by the linkages and capabilities
hallenges faced.
Against this background and given the stated political intention
n many OECD countries to improve the ability and willingness of
hallenges would multiply. For a complex – and largely failed – example see Rolfstam
t  al. (2011).icy 45 (2016) 414–426
public sector organisations to ask for, buy and adopt innovation
in the public sector (OECD, 2011; Edquist et al. 2015), the policy
consequences out of all this are compelling. Public procurement of
innovation needs an intermediation structure that is appropriate
to support public bodies across the various procurement situa-
tions and their corresponding challenges as deﬁned above. These
supporting structures would have to adhere to a set of design
principles, such as impartiality and neutrality in the marketplace,
accessibility and trustworthiness and would need to have access
to the sources of expertise and knowledge needed (Klerkx and
Leeuwis, 2009; Winch and Courtney, 2007). This infrastructure
could provide specialised process capabilities and technological,
economic and market knowledge across different technologies and
sectors, and support for interaction. It would have to be designed
as an enabler, and provisions would be needed to avoid potentially
counter-productive effects such as a simple “outsourcing” of pro-
curement. Such a structure would have to be made up of a limited
set of ﬂexible organisations that could accommodate the different
situations and challenges as already illustrated in our two  cases, not
one “super-intermediator”. Not only could this then support orga-
nisations on the demand side, it could also act as a transmission belt
of good practice and, above all, by supporting concrete procurement
processes it could support the learning process in organisations to
build up capacity for self-managed procurement in the future, as
successfully demonstrated in the donor chair case.
One of our examples, the Doppler case, has shown that even a set
of complementary intermediation efforts can be insufﬁcient. Inter-
mediation is not a panacea, as attitudes, incentive structures and
capabilities would still need to be changed more generally across
the public sector. However, the lack of such a supporting interme-
diation structure across OECD countries surely is a major reason for
the poor practice when it comes to buying innovation in the public
sector. Investing in it could have a lasting catalytical effect across
the public sector. To do so, the next step is to work towards a better
understanding of the conditions that determine the effectiveness
of intermediation between demand and supply of innovation.
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